Selected Publications


Reductivism, Nonreductivism, and Standards of Evidence in Ethics: Critical Notice of Bart Streumer's Unbelievable Errors
Analysis Reviews (Forthcoming)
[to be posted] [to be posted]

Very Short Abstract: I argue that reductivists and nonreductivists have compelling responses to Streumer's objections. I then argue that this offers a more compelling explanation of why we tend to resist believing the error theory than Streumer's explanation that we cannot believe it.

The Sense of Incredibility in Ethics
Philosophical Studies (Forthcoming)
[published draft] [penultimate draft]

Very Short Abstract: I develop a new Hybrid account of the nature of normative concepts and use it to explain away the Reductivist-unfriendly "just too different" intuition.

Moral Realism, Speech Act Diversity, and Expressivism: Critical Notice of Terence Cuneo's Speech and Morality: On the Metaethical Implications of Speaking
The Philosophical Quarterly (Forthcoming)
[published draft to be posted] [penultimate to be posted]

Very Short Abstract: I explore Cuneo's transcendental argument for moral realism from the fact that we perform speech acts, arguing along the way, among other things, that his argument isn't neutral between reductive and non-reductive realism and that the book contains resources for offering a new challenge to expressivists.

Epistemic Modesty in Ethics
Philosophical Studies (2018)
[published draft] [penultimate draft]  

Very Short Abstract: After explaining why we cannot know the true "first-order" ethical theory, I show, among other things, how Reductive Realists can appeal to this fact to defend their view from an influential objection.

Double Review (i.e. "Critical Notice") of On What Matters Volume Three by Derek Parfit and Does Anything Really Matter? Essays on Parfit on Objectivity edited by Peter Singer
Ethics (2018)
[published draft] [penultimate draft]  

Very Short Abstract: Over the course of summarizing Volume Three and Does Anything Really Matter?, I argue that Parfit does not give us strong reason to think that Naturalists, Expressivists, and Non-Realist Cognitivists agree.

Conceptual Analysis in Metaethics (Joint work with Stephen Finlay)
Routledge Handbook of Metaethics (2017)
[purchase] [draft]

Very Short Abstract: We critically survey, for a general philosophical audience, various positions on the nature, use, possession, and analysis of normative concepts, while highlighting some underappreciated problems for such positions along the way.

Non-Analytical Naturalism and the Nature of Normative Thought: A Reply to Parfit
Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (2015)
[published draft]

Very Short Abstract: I show that Derek Parfit's (2011) argument for the claim that Synthetic Reductive Realism is either false or incoherent fails.

How to Pull a Metaphysical Rabbit out of an End-Relational Semantic Hat
Res Philosophica (2014)
[published draft] [penultimate draft]

Very Short Abstract: I argue that there are several unacknowledged premises that Stephen Finlay (2014) needs to derive Reductivism about the metaphysics of goodness from his semantics for 'good'.


Rethinking Reductive Realism in Ethics (Dissertation)

Short Abstract: Reductive Realism is the view that it is possible to locate morality in the world as science and experience reveal it to us. Many opponents of Reductive Realism complain forcefully, however, that the view fails to take morality seriously. I develop responses to several versions of this kind of worry. Taking inspiration from debates about the nature of phenomenal consciousness in the philosophy of mind, I suggest that the apparent failure of Reductive Realism to respect the significance of morality stems not from the distinctive metaphysical nature of morality, but from our failure to appreciate the distinctive nature of the concepts that we use in thinking about morality.